

BERKELEY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
2020 Bonar Street, Berkeley CA 94702
Phone: (510) 644-8764
Meeting location: 2134 Martin Luther King Jr. Way

BOARD OF EDUCATION – MEETING AGENDA

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

BOARD OF EDUCATION

Josh Daniels, President
Judy Appel, Vice President
Karen Hemphill, Director
Beatriz Leyva-Cutler, Director / Clerk
Julie Sinai, Director
Shira Wolkenfeld, Student Director
Lajayah Moore, Student Director

STAFF

Donald E. Evans, Ed.D.,
Superintendent/Secretary
Javetta Cleveland, Deputy Superintendent
Neil Smith, Asst. Supt., Educational Services
Delia Ruiz, Asst. Supt., Human Resources
Jana Jandra, Board Recorder

BOARD OF EDUCATION MEETING AGENDA

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

The Presiding Officer will call the meeting to order at 5:30 p.m. and begin Open Session at 7:30 p.m.

Closed Session

The Board may recess into Closed Session before or after the public meeting under the authority of the Brown Act (including but not limited to Government Code section 54954.5, 54956.8, 54956.9, 54957, 54957.6, as well as Education Code section 35146). Under Government Code section 54954.3, members of the public may address the board on an item on the Closed Session agenda, before Closed Session.

CLOSED SESSION PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Persons wishing to address the Board should fill out a green speaker card. **Cards turned in by 6:00 p.m. will be given priority.** Speakers will be randomly selected based on topic and position, with BUSD students generally given priority. Public Testimony is limited to **15 minutes with a 3-minute limit per speaker per topic** although the time allotted per speaker may be reduced to 2 minutes at the discretion of the President.

- a. **Collective Bargaining – BCCE Update**
- b. **Superintendent's Evaluation**

OPEN SESSION

Roll Call

Approve Agenda of January 15, 2014

Read Mission and Meeting Overview

Closed Session Report

OPEN SESSION PUBLIC TESTIMONY (1st opportunity)

Persons wishing to address the Board should fill out a green speaker card. **Cards turned in by 7:15 p.m. will be given priority.** Speakers will be randomly selected based on topic and position, with BUSD students generally given priority. Public Testimony is limited to **30 minutes with a 3-minute limit per speaker per topic** although the time allotted per speaker may be reduced to 2 minutes at the discretion of the President.

Union Comments: Representatives from each union are given the opportunity to address the Board on any issue, 5 minutes per union. (Order rotates).

_____ BFT
_____ BCCE
_____ Local 21
_____ UBA

Committee Comments: Representatives from District committees that include members of the public are given the opportunity to address the Board on any issue. 5 minutes per committee.

_____ BSEP Program & Oversight Committee
_____ Measure I Construction Bond Oversight Committee
_____ Measure H Oversight Committee
_____ Parent Advisory Committee
_____ District EL Advisory Committee
_____ PTA Council
_____ Audit Committee

Board Member and Superintendent Comments: Board members and the Superintendent are given the opportunity to address any issue.

Approve Consent Items – No Discussion

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INFORMATION ITEMS

None

ACTION ITEMS – Approval Requested

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2	Approval of Yearly Facilities Plan Modifications (est. time 20 min.; 5 min. presentation; 10 min. discussion; 5 min. recap)	120

DISCUSSION ITEM – No approval requested

1	Update on LCAP (est. time 45 min.; 10 min. presentation; 30 min. discussion, 5 min. recap)	153
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OPEN SESSION Public Testimony (2nd opportunity) . Persons wishing to address the Board should fill out a green speaker card. **Cards turned in for the earlier open session public testimony will be given priority.** Speakers will be randomly selected based on topic and position, with BUSD students generally given priority. Public Testimony is limited to **15 minutes with a 3-minute limit per speaker per topic** although the time allotted per speaker may be reduced to 2 minutes at the discretion of the President

Extended Board Member and Superintendent Comment. Board members and the Superintendent are given the opportunity to address any issue.

Adjournment

BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

TO: Donald Evans, Ed.D., Superintendent
FROM: Neil Smith, Assistant Superintendent, Educational Services
Susan Craig, Director, Student Services
Lew Jones, Director of Facilities
DATE: January 15, 2014
SUBJECT: School Safety Audit Reports and Recommendations

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The December 2012 tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut prompted staff to recommend that the Board approve a more comprehensive review of facilities and safety procedures at every BUSD school with the guidance of professional school safety consultants and community partners. On January 23, 2013, the Board approved the hiring of two consultants to assist in this effort. Edu-Safe Associates was hired to provide professional guidance regarding preparedness for potential acts of violence, and Dimensions Unlimited was hired to provide professional guidance regarding disaster preparedness. Each consulting firm focused on its area of expertise but also commented on additional safety issues outside its precise scope of work. District summaries of both reports have been included with this overview.

Under the guidance of the Director of Student Services, the protocol included a site visit and analysis followed by a written report of findings and recommendations for each school site. All BUSD pre-schools, elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and the adult school were included in the safety audit. Community partners, including representatives from the Berkeley Police Department and the Berkeley Fire Marshal's office, participated in the site visits and provided recommendations in conjunction with the safety consultants. The initial site visits were conducted between February 28, 2013 and March 31, 2013 with follow up visits at most of the sites.

The final safety audits are quite extensive and contain a great deal of information, including crime reports in the areas near our schools. The report from Dimensions Unlimited primarily focuses on the continued need to train staff in disaster preparedness and acknowledges the work the District has done to prepare for an earthquake. The Edu-Safe report focuses on preparation for an armed intruder on campus and includes a precise rubric for evaluating each site in this area. Staff has reviewed the full reports and is making the following recommendations to make our schools safer.

SAFETY AUDIT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The rubric included in the Edu-Safe report is a useful tool to gauge our readiness, so we have adopted this system to evaluate our recommendations. The maximum achievable score is 110 points with a minimum passing score of 70 points. The Edu-Safe report includes District-wide recommendations and a report for each site that includes site-based recommendations and the results of a survey regarding preparedness for an armed intruder. The District has analyzed the scoring and recommendations from Edu-Safe with a goal of having all schools receive the minimum passing score. We have grouped the scoring sheet into five categories: the emergency plan (maximum score of 25), procedures (maximum score of 16), training (maximum score of 13), outside resources (maximum score of 23), and building modifications (maximum score of 33). In each section below, we list the total possible points and staff's recommendation on what elements can be reasonably implemented at all schools. A few recommendations can be implemented at some schools and not others.

EMERGENCY PLAN

The items in this section include whether there is a plan in place, how the plan is initiated, how the plan addresses ways to deal with an active shooter, and whether staff members are told to communicate with each other, the office or police. There are 25 possible points in this section, and staff is recommending that 24 be implemented at all sites. A plan to have a parking lot patrol person is not recommended at any site.

PROCEDURES

These items include whether the staff is directed to lock doors, under what circumstances doors are to be opened, whether visitors are sent to one location for entry, and whether there are first aid kits. There are 16 possible points in this section, and staff is recommending that all 16 be implemented at all sites.

TRAINING

These items include staff and student training in the Emergency Plan, training in the use of ladders, and medical staff training. There are 13 possible points in this section, and staff is recommending that 10 be implemented. Ensuring that we have medical staff trained in specific areas provides a total of 3 points and is not recommended by staff.

OUTSIDE RESOURCES

These items include training with police, school resource officer assignment and training, camera and public address monitoring by the police, and community resources committed to a response. By the very nature of this category, BUSD staff alone cannot dictate the outcomes. While this category can improve as we work with our partners, staff

wants to focus on areas within our control in this report. There are 23 possible points in this section, and we believe that we can achieve a minimum of 3 points at each school even though staff does not control outside resources. An additional 9 points that are associated with having a school resource officer can be achieved at Berkeley High School. It will be difficult in the near term to garner the 11 possible additional points to achieve a perfect score of 23 in this area, and it will require some further deliberation and discussions with the City and other agencies. However, staff believes that the police will coordinate with the schools in some joint trainings.

BUILDING CHANGES

These items include installing and monitoring camera systems, installing and utilizing public address systems, fencing the perimeter, locking doors from inside, metal detectors and secondary exits. There are 33 possible points in this section, and staff is recommending that we implement camera systems that can be viewed in the office and on the web and public address systems to achieve 22 points at all sites. Some sites may be able to garner an additional 3 points; however, additional changes to realize another 8 points cannot be reasonably implemented. Staff thinks that it is of highest importance to have functioning public address systems and cameras which can be monitored by multiple people both on and off site and that the buildings can be buzzed in from one location to enter the campus.

Most of our sites have perimeter fences; a few do not, and it would be difficult to implement at these sites. Interior locking doors will be phased in over time but are a lower priority than public address and camera systems. Together these two items would realize an additional 3 points. Further comment on the interior locking mechanisms or columbine locks is warranted. The consultant suggests a mechanism that could retrofit existing locks so that they could be left locked but not latch until the emergency begins. Unfortunately, such a mechanism is in violation of fire code in every location that is designated a fire corridor, which is true for the vast majority of our rooms. Currently several rooms do have the columbine locks, and we would anticipate changing out the locks to columbine locks as a part of our system replacement program in the bond.

Staff does not recommend implementing the ideas that would add an additional 8 points (dedicating a person to monitoring cameras, housing that person in a "safe room", metal detectors and secondary exits from all rooms).

OTHER NOTES

Edu-Safe made other recommendations which did not come with a score and are not being recommended by staff. These include the following: a) ID scans for all visitors; b) armed intruder drilling as frequently as fire drills (staff is recommending schools hold two armed intruder drills each year); c) the installation of panic buttons which staff could depress in an emergency; and d) the installation of cameras to monitor the park near Berkeley High School.

Copies of both District Reports and Recommendations have been included; a more complete report with recommendations for each school and the rubric for evaluating each school is being provided under separate cover.

DISTRICT GOAL

V-B – Parcel Tax and Bond Revenues: Provide the best possible education for all students by effectively utilizing local parcel tax and bond revenues.

POLICY/CODE

Education Codes 32280-32289

FISCAL IMPACT

There are financial costs to the General Fund, Measure H and the two bonds (Measure AA and Measure I). The cost to the General Fund is estimated to be \$15,000 for training this year. The cost to Measure H between now and the end of the summer of 2015 is estimated to be \$100,000. The cost to the two bonds over this period is estimated to be \$1,220,000. The cost to replace interior locks would be part of the system replacement projects and would be phased in over the life of the bond. If done as a stand-alone project, it might add an additional \$400-\$500,000.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Receive the safety audits and authorize staff to proceed with the expenditures in order to improve the safety of our schools.

Risk Analysis Update 2013 from Dimensions Unlimited

Program Background

The original Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD) Risk Analysis document was developed as a part of the U.S. Department of Education Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) \$250,000.00 Grant award to the Berkeley Unified School District, which was applied for in 2009 and implemented at the District level in 2010 - 2012.

The program implemented at Berkeley Unified School District included the development of a District Emergency Operations Plan, Program and a Risk Analysis. The Plan was adopted by the BUSD and a series of 3 comprehensive District Emergency Operation Center Disaster Exercises were conducted, which included participation of selected school sites and community representatives.

The planning process included outreach and meetings with City and County planning partners and identified community stakeholders. A joint Emergency Management Training Fair was conducted at King Middle School in partnership with Alameda County and other emergency response organizations.

Individual Emergency Operations Plan training classes were held with various District departments and schools. It was the intent of the project to train all BUSD personnel in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and to implement the District Emergency Operations Plan, School Site Disaster Plans and Emergency Standard Operating Procedures, as well as individual department response plans, throughout the District.

BUSD staff completed 233 FEMA on-line Incident Command training sessions, which included ICS 100, ICS 200, ICS 700 and ICS 800 Courses.

The BUSD successfully completed the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Grant Program by December 2011 and submitted its final report and evaluation in 2012.

Purpose of this Document

The purpose of this document is to provide a snapshot of the layout and general appearance of each school campus, which includes a listing of potential disaster risks to the campus and District. While it is not a detailed representation of each campus and building, it does enable planners and responders to see the general layout of the campus and certain campus physical features. The document aligns

potential damage and response protocols for the District when used in conjunction with the BUSD Emergency Operations Plan and Program.

Update 2013

This update is based on the results of 4 individual site visits to each campus during and after the REMS Grant Program Implementation.

- **2010 & 2011:** A site visit and initial survey of each campus was completed for the purpose of identifying specific disaster risks. Annex A (Risk Analysis) to the District Emergency Operations Plan was completed and implemented.
- **2010 and 2012:** BUSD School Site Disaster Plans and Emergency Operating Procedures were introduced to each school site. As well a disaster plan implementation meeting was held with principals and administrative staff of each site. The Site Disaster Plan was reviewed and implemented for each school.
- **2011 and 2012:** Each site received a School Site Disaster Plan and National Incident Management System (NIMS) Training session for staff, which included a table top earthquake disaster exercise. Three comprehensive District Emergency Operations Center full-scale exercises were held.
- **2013:** A School Site Safety Audit based on recent incidents involving shooting violence on school campuses was conducted. Annex A (Risk Analysis) was updated with the information obtained from the audit.

Findings & Recommendations Based On 2013 School Site Safety Audit

The School Site Safety Audit was initiated by BUSD primarily in response to recent school shooting and violence incidents. While school violence is a concern and one that needs to be addressed there are no standard policies, campus rating programs or other ways to identify risk to school sites. The U.S. Secret Service publication: [Preventing School Shootings](#) is the most up-to-date resource document to review and use as a planning tool. The document points out, "...there is no accurate or useful profile of 'the school shooter...'" It also points out that, "Personality and social characteristics of the shooters varied substantially...", which validates the fact that this variable makes standards and ratings for risk at schools extremely difficult to create and implement.

The definition of Active Shooter Situations the U. S. Department of Education planning guide uses is, "...those situations where an individual is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people with a firearm in a confined and populated area."

The U.S. Department of Education Guide for High Quality Emergency Operations Plans describes three options for response to an active shooter situation. These are options that are highlighted in preparing

general populations for violent situations. The three options are **Run, Hide, or Fight**. When planning future changes to school campuses it is important to keep these options in mind. The first option is run away from the shooter, out of a building and as far away as possible until you are in a safe location. The second option is to hide in a secure place and deny the shooter access. The third option is to fight or incapacitate the shooter, as a last resort to survive. School site staffs should work together to identify the nearest exits, locate secure areas within the facility and identify ways to incapacitate a shooter (as a last resort).

General Observations

Each site was found to be in good-to-exceptional condition based on maintenance and upkeep. The general disaster safety ratings issued by the BUSD Facilities Management Department were not changed as a result of the audit. Improvement of site readiness since the 2011 and 2012 site visits were noted, such as updating equipment and supplies in the Site Emergency Containers.

The following recommendations are based on information received from the school site staffs and audit observations:

Readiness

1. (Identified as most Important by site staffs.) Continue to practice and update safety training, exercises, plans and procedures put into place from the REMS 2010 and 2011 programs. This is the foundation for a solid School Emergency Operations and Safety Program. It provides a standardized and practiced approach to localized response to incidents which go beyond the BUSD's day-to-day operations, whether the event is a shooting on a school campus or a major earthquake.
2. Continue bringing Community Partners in to work with the School District and Sites to update current and identify new response and recovery strategies, protocols and resources to respond to a crisis.
3. Continually update the Emergency Operations and Safety Plans with active strategies to address targeted school violence and other events.
4. In all disasters including shootings, school personnel will find themselves in the position of being the immediate first responders to an emergency incident. Training and practice is the primary way to respond to that role by using NIMS, coordinating with emergency response agencies and conducting periodic disaster and emergency exercises. A recommendation is to establish, at the district level, an ongoing proactive program to keep school staffs trained in the basics of emergency and disaster response.

Communications

1. Throughout disaster preparedness and response research covering the last 20 years, the single most important problem identified are issues related to communication deficiencies and failures in communication systems, not just in schools but in all sections of a community. The ability to warn populations, respond to disasters, allocate resources effectively and recover from incidents is dependent on an efficient and dependable communications system and an accurate information collection and dissemination system. These comprise the backbone to an effective response to and recovery from an emergency situation.
2. Every principal at each site visited in BUSD advised that their public address, warning and campus-wide communication systems were either nonexistent, not operating or deficient in some way. Administrators demonstrated that they could not cover the entire site with an emergency alert, a warning, or vital response information. Each site also identified problems communicating with the District Office in emergencies and on a day-to-day basis by radio and/or telephone systems. A recommendation is to conduct a District-wide Communication Evaluation & Survey should be conducted to identify a Standardized District Communications System that will work for complete and effective communication coverage for school sites, school-to-school and school-to-district. The system should include
 - a. The ability of school sites to communicate internally and externally.
 - b. The ability to provide complete site public address service.
 - c. The ability to operate on a battery or a backup power system.

Campus Security

For these findings, campus security includes Ingress and egress on campuses, public access and gaps in security fencing and gates.

Each school site identified and referred to a number of campus security problems:

1. Parking, traffic congestion, and lack of control over persons entering and leaving the campus were identified. These problems were observed to be greatest at the start and end of school days because of drop off and pick up of students. Recommendations are to station traffic control personnel at key positions during peak times. Use recognizable and standardized traffic control devices to mark vehicle approaches, parking areas and speed limits. Work with residents to ensure their compliance with scheduled pick up and drop off times, temporary traffic control measures and areas designated for pick up and drop off of students. Collaborate with local law enforcement to assist in problem areas or in dangerous situations.

2. The public use of the campuses during the school day and the perception of residents that some school campus are meant to be utilized as a park was identified. A recommendation is to adopt a District-wide policy for day use throughout the system, which would include enlisting the help of local law enforcement to help enforce the policy.
3. Multiple unmonitored gates and doors leading into campuses and school buildings were identified. Students and staff were observed propping doors open that should remain closed and locked. A recommendation is for each site to determine their primary ingress/egress points and implement plans to secure all others.
4. Fences and gates around campuses were observed to vary in height, be in various states of repair and vary in their ability to deter access to the campus. A recommendation is for the District to determine standards for fencing height, design, and installation for school sites. Each site must be evaluated to determine access points. Projects to standardize and upgraded school sites must be planned, financed and implemented by the District.
5. School site administrative personnel identified issues concerning controlling front office entry onto campuses by visitors, issuing visitor passes when checking in and requiring all visitors to check out. Sometimes front desks go unoccupied, which does not afford visual control over who is coming and going. None of the sites have the ability to remotely stop persons from entering onto the campus before reaching the front office. Most all sites have signage encouraging visitors to approach the front office before continuing onto the campus, however. A recommendation is to conduct a physical security audit of each site to help determine whether a remotely operated entry and/or observation system would be viable or whether a 'funneling' system for visitors to enter the office could be designed and installed.
6. Schools are perceived as open safe areas in times of emergencies and disasters and the public does migrate to them. Residents think of schools as places first, to check on or pick their family members and second, to seek safety and assistance following a disaster. Schools are perceived in times of emergencies as gathering places, medevac landing areas, medical treatment areas, information and resource distribution areas and community shelters. Schools play an important role as part of the community's emergency response program. A recommendation is to work with community leaders and residents in developing a site-by-site 'Refuge Plan' for school facilities that best serves the safety and security of each school population while also working to serve the needs of neighborhood residents in times of disaster.

Classroom Security for Active Shooter Situations

In an active shooter situation the U.S. Department of Education identifies “hiding” as the recommendation when running is not a safe option. In order to hide students and staff effectively, the USDE recommends:

- Lock the doors
- Barricade doors with heavy furniture
- Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows
- Turn off the lights
- Silence all electronic devices
- Remain silent
- Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of view from the hallway. (allowing for an ambush or escape if the shooter enters the room)
- Use strategies to communicate with first responders if possible
- Remain in place until given an ‘all clear’ by an identifiable law enforcement officer

The following findings and recommendations are for securing buildings and classrooms with the “Hide” response option in mind:


1. On nearly every school campus, classroom and office doors could only be locked from the outside. School personnel contacted during the audit had the perception that it was better to be in a classroom or area that was or could be locked from the inside. A recommendation is to change door mechanisms so rooms can be locked from the inside or to provide rooms with a temporary emergency locking device and train teachers how to deploy it.

NOTE: The primary concern with doors that are locked from the inside is that it causes difficulty in conducting search and rescue operations after an earthquake or as part of a law enforcement sweep following a shooting incident. Carefully prepared policies are needed that gives guidance to the staff when it is appropriate to lock the doors and when they should be left unlocked. Also, as a case-in-point, the Oakland Unified School District recently experienced staff being locked out of classrooms by students; suggesting that the type of locks used should not be able to be readily deployed by students.

2. All of the campuses visited identified a lack of adequate window coverings in classrooms. Many of the window blinds and coverings were poorly maintained and could not be adjusted. A recommendation is to replace or upgrade window coverings as necessary to support the Hide response option and to refresh coverings periodically.

Recommendation for Further Action

While this document is an update of the existing BUSD risk analysis, it only reflects the most current conditions at the time of preparation. It is pointed out that the best plan of action is to negate a risk by taking mitigation measures prior to an incident or disaster. A recommendation is for the Berkeley Unified School District to subscribe to the 2002 U.S. Secret Service Safe Schools Initiative Report Recommendations and to organize a Threat Assessment Team that is charged with continually monitoring, auditing and recommending actions aimed at improving safety and security at school sites. The Secret Service report and a summary of it are available through the National Threat Assessment Center online at <http://www.treas.gov/usss/ntac>.



Edu-Safe Associates


7/25/2013

Chapter One

Comprehensive

District Report

And Recommendations



Edu-Safe Associates

Introduction

The purpose of this project is to conduct a District-Wide Assessment of the safety of the Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD). A total of twenty one school sites were included in the study. This project included visits to each school site, interviews with administrators and staff, physical security surveys, armed intruder response surveys, analysis of the individual school safety plans, and analysis of related crime information in the immediate vicinity of each school site. The emergency plans of all schools have been analyzed and evaluated. Initial visits, including tours of all schools, accompanied by administrators and staff were completed. Surveys were completed by consultants and administrators of the respective schools. Safety Inspections of the schools were conducted by the consultants. All of the data gained from these sources has been analyzed and evaluated as described in the “Methods” section below.

Methods

The initial contacts with the schools were campus visits that included introductions to administrators and safety staff, a walk through the entire campus, and informal interviews of administrators and staff. Prior to the initial visits, the safety plans of the respective schools were reviewed and a detailed analysis was completed following the initial visits. Surveys which focused on the physical security of the school and the readiness to withstand an armed intruder attack were completed by the consultants in cooperation with school administrators. Each administrator was asked to compile a list of “Top Ten” safety concerns. These were reviewed with administrators during initial site visits and follow up visits. Crime information related to the neighborhoods of each campus was obtained from the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) website, and registered sex offender information was obtained from the “Megan’s Law” database. All of this information was compiled analyzed and evaluated. The findings based on the analysis and evaluations were published in a comprehensive report of each school.

Data Interpretation and Analysis

The individual school reports contain ten sections. Each report starts with an overview of the school, which includes the location of the school, student population, and number of staff, persons involved in the site visits, interviews and a school site safety overview. The current safety protocol, violent intruder protocol, school staff training overview and student safety training overview are discussed in

the following sections of each respective report. The examination of the reports continues with sections on recent school developments, safety plan analysis, and recommendations. Each section of each report contains an analysis and evaluation of the data and information gathered from the various instruments and procedures described in the “Methods” section above. The information from each school report was analyzed by the consultants to identify district wide trends. These trends are discussed in the following “Conclusions” section of this report.

Conclusions

The Berkeley school district should be commended for requesting this district-wide assessment. The schools in the district represent a diversity of socioeconomic, ethnic groups, and neighborhoods. Just as in most school districts, the schools in Berkeley are microcosms of the communities in which they exist. All of the advantages and disadvantages of the community are reflected on the various school campuses. Clear trends related to the safety of the schools were identified in the course of this project. Specific areas were identified for district-wide attention which includes: Armed Intruder Response, Locking Mechanisms, Site Safety Plans, Emergency Drills, Campus Visitor Procedures, Lockdown Procedures, Crime Prevention, Safety Training, Site Security, and Recommendations.

Armed Intruder Response.

In the current social environment of our world, school shootings are a tragic fact of life. Although statistically rare, school shootings produce devastating results for students, families, school staffs, members of the community and the nation at large. There have been a total of 137 fatal school shootings that killed 297 victims since 1980. Schools are potential victims of these attacks because they are “Soft Targets” or undefended targets. The nature of a school campus requires openness and a feeling of belonging to foster education of the students. BUSD must find the balance between open inviting campuses and protection of the lives of the students and staff.

The instrument used to measure the readiness of each school to deal with an armed intruder is a survey developed by Response Options. The survey contains questions about the procedures, training, equipment and school design which are factors in the response to an armed intruder. Each question receives a weighted yes or no answer. The scores of the weighted answers are tallied and a numerical total representing the degree to which the school is prepared for an attack by an armed intruder is produced. A minimum score of 0 to 69 indicates that the school is not prepared for an armed intruder. None of the schools in the district showed a score above 69. Scores varied widely from 15 to 52. Each survey is contained in each individual school report as an attachment. The administrators of the respective schools should use the survey elements to find ways to increase the survey score, thereby enhancing the preparedness to deal with an armed intruder.

Recommendations for improving the readiness of each school are contained in the report of each respective school. The general recommendations to be implemented district-wide include, “Armed Intruder Response” training for all school staffs, locking mechanisms which allow teachers to quickly lock classroom doors from inside the classroom, Public Address (P.A.) Systems that are audible and

comprehensible campus wide, surveillance cameras which cover most of the campus, and monthly drills consistent with the procedures in the safety plan of each school. In addition, a debriefing should take place following every drill.

Several safety consulting companies offer training programs related to armed intruders for schools and colleges. We recommend that BUSD provides this training to their staff. The district should consider which companies and programs would best prepare the respective school staffs to react to an armed intruder, in a manner that would increase the likelihood of saving lives and reducing injuries. The components of an effective training program should include three options: evacuate, lock down with enhanced fortification, and counter techniques as a last resort. We recommend the A.L.I.C.E. armed intruder response training. This training has been conducted at thousands of schools and colleges nationwide with positive results.

Locking Mechanisms

The standard locking mechanisms installed in most California schools must be locked from outside of the room. The recommended replacement mechanism is the “Columbine Lock”. These locking devices allow the door to be locked from inside the classroom quickly and safely. The inhibiting factor of the “Columbine Locks” is the cost. Each lock costs several hundred dollars. There are two low cost alternatives to these devices that warrant consideration. The first is the “Lockdown Magnet”. This device is a magnetic strip that holds the latch of the door from entering the strike plate of the door jamb. To lock the door, the strip is removed which allows the latch to lock in place. Removing the strip requires that the door is opened slightly for a second or two then closed quickly.

Another device is also available – The “School Safe Lock”. This is a small metal switching device which fits on the door jamb. As with the lock magnet, the door latch is in the locked position, but the switch prevents the latch from engaging. To activate the device, the door must be opened slightly, the switch pushed with a fingertip and the door pulled closed. Both of these devices are available at about one percent of the cost of the “Columbine Locks.”

Public Address System

An efficient and effective public address system is critical to school emergency response. The importance of the ability to communicate with all staff and students during a crisis or emergency cannot be understated. Most of the schools in the BUSD have no public address system and rely on the phone and intercom system to communicate with staff. These systems operate with varying degrees of consistency from campus to campus. Some schools have portable public address systems that can be heard in some areas of the school; however these are not practical in emergency situations. In the schools that have public address systems, some the systems are in need of maintenance and are not audible or comprehensible throughout the campus.

One system that works well for the campus in which it is installed is at Oxford Elementary School. The school uses the standard phone/ intercom system in conjunction with exterior speakers. The messages

are audible and clear campus wide. The system might not be feasible for other campuses; however it could be utilized on some campuses that are similar in design and layout to Oxford. Each campus should be studied, and the most cost effective and efficient public address systems should be installed district wide.

Site Safety Plans

Following the tragic recent events of many school shootings, and in particular, Sandy Hook Elementary School, schools around the nation are reviewing and revising their Emergency Operations Procedures and Lockdown Procedures. Again BUSD should be commended for joining these schools in doing so.

When it comes to these procedures, there is no “one size fits all”. Each plan must consider and reflect the differences in school designs, the atmosphere of surrounding areas, public safety response capability, budgets, and intra-district response capabilities. Many, if not most, lockdown drills that look impressive in writing or have performed well during basic practice drills, have significant flaws when there is an attempt to use them during critical and emergent circumstances.

When staff members have to make actual decisions, even during simulations, and communicate their lockdown decisions, we have seen fail rates of 60% and even as high as 80-85%. Much of this falls in line with the studies independently conducted by Ben Sherwood author of “The Survivors Club: The Secrets and Science that Could Save Your Life,” and Laurence Gonzales author of “Deep Survival.” Ben Sherwood was able to develop what he calls the 10/80/10 rule as a result of his studies into survivability, during times in which stressful situations are experienced coupled with the introduction of hormonal induced adrenalin. As a result of this lengthy study, results showed that 10% of the population will handle a crisis in a relatively calm and rational state of mind. These are people who have a planned, practiced response. They have committed themselves to both real world and to mental rehearsal. By committing themselves to this concept, this 10% has pre-programmed the pathways of their minds for success and not failure with several levels of stress inoculation:

- a. Under duress they pull themselves together quickly.
- b. They have the ability to assess situations clearly.
- c. Their decision making is sharp and focused.
- d. They are able to develop priorities, make plans, and they take appropriate action when they are exposed to a crisis.

Laurence Gonzales’ study revealed that this works, and one of the reasons this works is because of the way the brain processes new information. The brain creates behavior scripts to automate what we do. Behavioral scripts are an extension to the concept of mental models. Mental models make us more efficient at processing information. The brain creates simplified models for quick reference.

A behavioral script takes tasks that require all of our attention and transforms them into tasks that require none of it, freeing attention for other things. Behavioral scripts help us to get around faster and with less effort. A behavioral script will embody mental models, which identify objects in the world and the rules by which they behave.

The remainder of Ben Sherwood's study revealed that 80% of the population will either do nothing to help or nothing to make the situation worse, and 10% of the population will do the wrong thing and exacerbate the situation.

Ben Sherwood concluded, "We should never confuse faith that you will prevail in the end with discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your situation. You have to have a plan of action, and you have to be able to act on it". You cannot just sit there and hope that your plan of action will work for you in a time of crisis, if you have not prepared yourself with training that introduces stress inoculations.

Lt. Col. David Grossman in his studies on the Psychology of killing, "Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill," has found in his research that "the human brain is the most effective survival mechanism known to man, but only when properly prepared."

When preparing for lockdown drills, school staffs must ensure that a variety of situations are considered. The recent Texas incident that resulted in the stabbing of 14 students on a junior college campus should serve to remind us that a "violent intruder" may not necessarily indicate a perpetrator with a gun or an "active shooter." Drills that are focused just on active shooter situations, or just lock down have a propensity for higher rates of failure when other types of incidents occur. Dr. Gary Klein's research published in "Mental Simulation for creating Realistic Behavior in Physical Security Systems Simulation" has shown that persons who experience through both physical and mental simulation preparation on a wide range of crisis situations are better prepared to make life and death decisions more effectively. The more frequent the training on this perishable skill, a skill that will be lost if it is not practiced, the more likely for success when a crisis occurs. It is imperative that armed intruder drills are practiced often incorporating these activities.

BUSD Schools should consider providing options and consider changing policy guidelines from using the words "shall" to using the words "should" in safety plans. The Department of Homeland Security has recommended that schools should have options to increase survivability during lockdowns. Schools that only have one type of lockdown procedure are more likely to have a plan failure during a crisis. Having lower level "preventative" options or what we might call a "soft" lockdown option, is very important because many situations where lockdowns are in fact needed do not involve weapons.

However, when a weapon is involved, enhanced options must be considered for both staff and the students, to increase the possibility for survivability during an armed intruder situation versus just having a "lockdown in place" as a singular option. A "lockdown" in and of itself, does not provide enough options to invoke during a dynamic situation, such as an active shooter. The procedure also is ineffective against the natural human instincts of Fight, Flight, or Fear and the outcomes associated with those instincts during a crisis. "Lock-downs" can be very valuable and can be very effective, when

two critical factors are involved: enough time to complete the “lock-down” and an opportunity to enhance the “lock-down”.

BUSD schools must be consistent with their procedures. Too many verbal codes kill and confuse the first responders. This increases the likelihood that the wrong protocol would be used due to confusion in codes and a lack of consistency among the schools to use the same codes. Simplicity of the procedure is the key. Simply state what the emergency is. “Lockdown violent intruder” is more effective during a crisis situation and easier to process by a brain already experiencing cognitive shutdown. The wrong code, bell or other alarm will cause confusion deciding which protocol to activate. This can result in more casualties, and create more unneeded chaos not to mention increased liability concerns.

All staff members should have access to and be issued important keys during staff development. If a door is not locked or a staff member cannot unlock an area for evacuation, even by a single employee who is unable to lockdown, more casualties can occur. It is important to train staff members and issue them the tools they need to keep the building and campus secure throughout the day. Staff members should be given ample practice in physically performing evacuation and lockdown procedures before a crisis.

Amanda Ripley outlines in her book “The Unthinkable”, people in crisis often fail to perform seemingly simple tasks when it would be clear to any rational person that an action should be taken. This in large part is due to a lack of proper preparation both in static and dynamic training atmospheres.

Doors should be locked during instructional hours and locked when the door is not actively in use. The method in which many schools operate can impact the practicality of this approach, but in general this is only a small adjustment to make within the school culture. Some teachers feel that an open door creates an inviting atmosphere. Experience has shown us that a locked door does not impact the classroom atmosphere or learning environment in a negative way. Keeping a classroom door locked also has positive impacts. In addition to the safety benefits of doing this, it also creates an emphasis on timeliness, and discipline among the student body.

If staff are not trained with staff initiated drills, individual staff members and teachers are less likely to respond effectively during a crisis. Often times, the threat that occurs on a school grounds that creates a “lockdown” situation, takes place in parts of the school away from the main office. This demonstrates to us that it is important to hold drills in which different staff members are required to make the decision to initiate a lockdown without consulting anyone. This provides all employees with that option which in turn increases chances for survivability. Of course there must be an effective means of communication available for staff to notify and respond to each other in this situation.

While the timing of this practice drill should be determined by administrators or the district office, individual staff should be required to make lockdown decisions after being prompted with a scenario. Many assume that staff will perform how we want them to, however in actual events; the incredible stress of a crisis situation has extreme effects on the human body. In the ill prepared individual, this

will result in the natural “fight, flight or freeze” situation which is not an appropriate reaction by someone who is responsible for children.

In her book, Ripley describes a Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in which some employees looked for a supervisor to whom they could report the fire while a busboy started taking immediate action to evacuate the building saving hundreds of lives that would have otherwise been lost due to a delayed response. This is also plausible during a violent intruder event. If school staffs and students are not prepared and armed with options to utilize during a violent intruder event, the delayed response has shown in past school incidents to have caused a higher mortality rate that could have been averted with additional preparation, training and options to utilize in the moment of a dynamic evolving violent situation.

The study of the respective BUSD school campuses revealed a consistent discrepancy between the practical lock down procedures employed by the schools and the procedures outlined in the safety plan of the schools. In most of the schools, the consultants found that the safety plans contained procedures for locking down the school in response to an armed intruder, sniper, or hostage situation. The safety plans provided for code words such as “Code Red” or “Code Red. This is not a drill”. However, the practice described by the staff members at the school differed from those in the safety plan. Most schools reported that they used the plain English command of “Lock Down”. At least one school uses the peculiar phrase “Do you want a cup of coffee?” We recommend that a standardized procedure for locking down the school should be implemented district-wide. The command should be simply “Lock Down” repeated three times. This should be followed by a brief description of the reason (e.g. “Gunman on campus” or “Man with a gun on campus”).

The safety plans of the respective schools are very comprehensive and well written. They range from about fifty to over two hundred and fifty pages in length. However, the study revealed that staff and faculty were unfamiliar with much of the information contained in the safety plans. We recommend that the portions of the safety plans that contain emergency procedures should be standardized district-wide and incorporated into the emergency charts that are distributed to schools. The information in the emergency charts must be consistent with the information in the emergency plans of the specific schools. This avoids confusion during emergency responses and limits liability.

The consultants also found that the safety plans followed National Incident Management System (NIMS) procedures to varying degrees. Some were more consistent with NIMS than others. Some of the plans included the Incident Command System, however some did not. The I.C.S. system should be included in the safety plan of each school. Moreover I.C.S. procedures should be incorporated into the regular school drills. Finally, school staff and faculty should complete the online I.C.S. training available through the Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA).

Policies and Procedures.

Emergency Drills and Lockdown Procedures

As mentioned above, the lock down procedures and emergency drill procedures practiced at many of the schools varies from the procedures stated in the safety plan of the schools. The procedures also differ from school to school. It is understandable that procedures for emergency response at elementary schools would be different from those at middle schools, high schools and alternative schools. It is very important that the procedures are consistent at the respective school levels. The emergency procedures and frequency of drills should be in compliance with Californian Education Code provisions and practiced with the same frequency at each school level. The consistency of the drills at the respective schools is of paramount importance as the studies cited above indicate. The consultants found that the schools are mostly in compliance with fire drill requirements, but lock down drills are conducted quarterly, semi-annually or not at all. Our recommendation is that lock down drills should be conducted with the same frequency as fire drills. The threat to student safety is much more likely from a school shooting incident than a school fire.

The emergency drills present an opportunity for faculty and staff to be trained on the contents of the school safety plan. The practical exercise of the drill reinforces the procedures in the written plan and demonstrates the importance of efficiently and effectively following those procedures. When drills are conducted at a school site, a public safety representative should be invited to observe the drill. The public safety representative should de-brief the principal following the drill. This would foster cooperation between the schools and police and fire departments, and improve the effectiveness of the drills.

The procedures for each drill should be practiced in accordance with the school safety plan. A debriefing of the drills should be conducted at the end of the school day with faculty. This debriefing should include the information provided by the public safety representative and observations of staff, and faculty. The purpose of the debriefing is to find ways to improve procedures with each drill and underscore the importance of the procedures to faculty staff and students. Most important is the mental preparation and confidence which results from the practice of the drills. The procedures for emergency response should be attached to QR codes which faculty and staff would then scan and download to their mobile devices. This would allow staff instant access to the information in an emergency regardless of their location on campus.

Campus Visitor Polices

As stated above in the “Armed Intruder” section school campuses should be open and welcoming places to parents and students. However, a balance between openness and security must be maintained regarding access to visitors on campus. Elementary schools in particular face the challenge of unauthorized parents coming onto the campus. Some contributing factors are: there are no school security personnel on elementary campuses. The age of elementary students causes greater concern among parents about actions involving their children on campus. The problem of uncontrolled and unauthorized visitors was greater on some campuses than others, but clearly greater at the elementary level and middle school level.

The most common problems encountered with parents include parents who enter the campus without checking in with the office, or wander the halls when they are not supposed to do so. Parents not checking in with staff when coming in or leaving, parents who come to school angry or come to school post or pre-domestic violence events, parents displaying inappropriate behavior patterns.

There are also parents who continually come to the school grounds and enter the classrooms without following the protocols, checking in, or making an appointment. Parents place their students in danger when drooping of their children or picking them up, by allowing them to cross the street illegally and encouraging this behavior from their children.

We recommend that BUSD schools consider having an I.D. scan of visitors to the campus. In addition, the schools should require that each visitor, including parents, sign in as a mandatory requirement of coming on campus. This sign-in should include a time in and out, their name, the name of the student and specific destination for their visit. Each school campus should be evaluated for pedestrian safety with emphasis on arrival and dismissal times. Crossing guards should be assigned to locations in which pedestrian accidents involving students or parents have occurred or where near misses of such situations have occurred.

Crime Prevention

There are very effective crime prevention procedures that can be implemented by the BUSD to improve campus safety. The first is to consider establishing a neighborhood watch group in each school neighborhood. The principal of the school should host some of the meetings on the school campus. Positive communication between the administrator(s) and the neighbors of then school is a powerful tool to be used to prevent crime in school neighborhoods. The principal should also communicate regularly with the respective beat officer or community liaison of the Berkeley Police Department. This will foster communication lines with the police department and alert them to campus concerns. Requests for more police presence to deal with traffic matters, disorderly conduct, etc. can be met through regular meetings with these officials.

The district should implement an instant reporting system for crime related matters. Hotlines for reporting bullying, vandalism, violence etc. can be provided by companies such as “We Tip,” or “Tip Soft.” The district might also consider an in-house system utilizing a number to which anonymous tips can be sent by text. This is an inexpensive method of improving communication between the district, students, and parents, which demonstrates a commitment to safety and security on the part of the

school district.

The school district should consider providing Citizen Emergency Response Training to middle and high school students and staff. This training instills confidence, respect for law and order and critical skills that can be applied in the event of a disaster. Parents might be invited to participate in the program as well.

The district should work with social service agencies and community groups to strengthen gang prevention and crime prevention efforts. The Berkeley 2020 Vision for Youth Program can be utilized to assist in this goal. The district should also coordinate with the probation and state parole departments to determine which students are on criminal probation or parole (within legal privacy limits) and refer them to the appropriate school counseling staff or other services. This recommendation is similar to a recommendation from BPD to BUSD in March 2011. The following is a quote of the recommendation.

Most BUSD students have little or no criminal or disciplinary history. Research has shown, however, that gun possession is higher among youth with a history of delinquency, gang membership, and other misconduct. Truancy and increased likelihood of crime are linked. A comprehensive anti-truancy program can help prevent crime and victimization. We recommend a data-driven early warning system designed to ensure that students starting down the wrong path receive increased attention in the way of support and enforcement. This can be aided by partnerships with local agencies including Berkeley Youth Alternates, Berkeley Police, Berkeley Health, Alameda County Youth Probation and District Attorney, and others.

Along with the above recommendation, the BUSD should have an advanced data collection, analysis, sharing and reporting program. Strategies that are data driven are among the most logical ways for officials to stay informed, limit rumors and ensure staff is deployed in the most efficient manner possible. In addition with that, ensure the Berkeley Police Department is notified of all incidents that require reporting to local law enforcement and all illegal incidents that require suspension or expulsion. This sharing would help improve response to crime and other issues in close proximity to schools.”

Students and staff should be required to wear identification on campus. The district should consult with faculty, parents and students then implement an identification system which clearly identifies a person as authorized to be on campus. This would improve the site security of each campus significantly.

Site Security

Several factors affecting site security have been covered in other sections above. This section offers specific recommendations for improving site security which overlaps with those sections.

All visitors must be required to sign in when entering any school campus. This must be done consistently and efficiently. Scanning devices which are available from commercial companies can scan driver's licenses and instantly store that information, while simultaneously logging the time and date of the scan. The devices and software can also be used to store photos of persons requesting entry that do not have any identification on their person. These devices cost slightly more than a locking device for a school room door and provide significant security to the school.

The schools should also be responsible for locking all gates after school begins and installing signage that clearly directs visitors to a single main entrance that is monitored, and requires the check-in practice describe above.

The physical security of all campuses should be reviewed. Proper fencing and gates must be installed or repaired to ensure that unauthorized persons do not enter the school campuses. Signage directing visitors to the office is present at some, but not all school sites. Conspicuous signage should be placed around the entire perimeter of every school.

The front door of each school should be electronically controlled, with surveillance cameras in place. These would allow school staff to see everyone requesting entry before allowing them into the building.

We recommend that the district should survey the perimeter barriers of each school and make the necessary improvements. The school district should review the provisions of Measure Y and find ways within the current law to fortify the fencing and physical barriers to entry onto school grounds.

The district should negotiate with BPD to increase School Resource Officer staffing. We recommend staffing SRO's at the middle school level. The same school security officers could also assist at elementary schools when needed. These officers could be available on a regular basis to teach crime prevention and personal safety strategies to elementary and middle school students. If the district administration determines that SRO staffing is not a feasible option, School security staff should be increased at the middle school level, and security officers should be considered for elementary schools that have a greater need for on campus security. School security staff should receive a minimum of 24 hours of training per year. Ideally this training should be done in six or eight hour sessions throughout the school year, and in accordance with SB 1626. The district should also consider equipping school security officers with appropriate restraining devices. The security staff must be able to restrain people that are posing an immediate threat to students and staff.

Communication

Communication between and among staff at the various campuses is in need of improvement. This is particularly notable among and between campuses that are in close proximity to each other. School administrators and staffs of the campuses that share a property or are within city blocks of each other should collaborate on all aspects of safety and crisis planning.

Technical communication is also a challenge. Most of the schools have no public address system and rely on the phone and intercom systems to communicate with staff. These systems operate with varying degrees of consistency from campus to campus. Some schools have portable public address systems that can be heard in some areas of the school; however these are not practical in emergency situations. In the schools that have public address systems, the systems are in need of maintenance and are not audible or comprehensible throughout the campus. As stated above adequate public address systems should be installed on all campuses.

All faculty and staff at every school should be trained in tactical communication. These skills are invaluable when dealing with resistant or angry people on campus. Staff would be better able to resolve conflicts that might otherwise result in personal violence or vandalism. This training would enhance the ability of staff to react in stressful or emergency situations. The training would also complement staff training in conjunction with safety drills.

School and Public Safety Meetings

The school district should hold monthly meetings with administrators of each school and police, fire, district attorney, social services, public health, probation, and county office of education personnel. These meetings should be used to discuss current safety and security problems and find collaborative ways and means to provide solutions. The synergy of such a group would be very powerful, and would greatly enhance the safety of the entire school district.

<https://member.carefirst.com/wps/portal/Member/MemberHome>